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WHEN WILL RENTAL INCOME TERMINATE THE
SUBCHAPTER S ELECTION? AN ARGUMENT IN





Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 permits a properly
electing corporation 2 to have its income, with an exception for certain cap-
ital gains, 3 taxed directly to its shareholders rather than to the corporation
itself under the usual corporate rules. 4 While some taxpayers mistakenly
believe that the subchapter S status permits the electing corporation to be
taxed as a partnership, a subchapter S corporation does not act as a con-
duit in precisely the same manner as a partnership. Under subchapter S,
taxable income is calculated at the corporate level and then passed on to
the shareholders without individual items of income and deduction retain-
ing their character in the hands of the shareholders5 as they do in the case
of partnerships.
The mechanics of subchapter S can be briefly summarized. First, all of
the shareholders of a qualifying small business corporation 6 must make a
proper election as prescribed in section 1372 of the Code. Because the
corporate tax provisions of the Code do not apply, corporate income is
passed through directly to the shareholders, whether or not it is actually
* B.S., Southeastern Massachusetts University; I.D., New England School of Law;
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.
1. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
2. Id. §§ 1372(a)-(d). The corporation makes the election after each shareholder has
consented. The corporation must make the election either during the first 75 days of the
taxable year or anytime during the preceding taxable year.
3. Id. § 1378. To prevent corporations from making a subchapter S election for a one-
time capital gain, § 1378 provides that, if the net capital gain of the corporation exceeds
$25,000, the corporation is taxed on the excess unless the election has been in effect for three
years or, if less than three years, if the election has been in effect since incorporation.
4. Under usual corporate rules, income would be taxed both at the corporate level and
again after distribution to the shareholders. Id. §§ i, 63, 301.
5. One exception to this result is a stockholder's proportionate share of net capital gain
that, to the extent of a distribution of current earnings and profit, is treated as a long-term
capital gain under id. § 1375.
6. A qualifying corporation must be a domestic corporation that (I) is not a member of
an affiliated group, (2) does not have more than 15 shareholders, (3) does not have a share-
holder who is not an individual (except for certain trusts and estates), (4) does not have a
nonresident alien shareholder, and (5) does not have more than one class of stock. Id.
§§ 1371(a)(l)-(4).
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distributed. 7 Dividend treatment obtains for the shareholders under the
general corporate distribution rules8 to the extent of the lesser of taxable
income or current earnings and profits, except for a shareholder's pro rata
share of net capital gain.9 Net operating losses of the electing corporation
also are passed through directly to shareholders, but the amount allowable
as a deduction is limited to the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock,
plus the adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the corporation to him.' 0
Once made, a valid election continues until it is terminated either by the
affirmative refusal of a new shareholder to consent to the election, by the
consent of all shareholders, by the corporation's ceasing to qualify as a
small business corporation, or by the corporation's deriving more than
eighty percent of its gross receipts from sources outside the United States
or more than twenty percent of its gross receipts from passive investment
income."I Since rents fall within the category of passive investment in-
come, 12 a corporation that leases real or personal property will lose its sub-
chapter S status if its rental income exceeds the twenty percent limitation,
unless it also provides significant services to the lessee as provided in the
regulations. 13
In 1966 Congress attempted to mitigate the harsh results of the passive
investment income restrictions on new corporations by adding a new sub-
paragraph that prevents subchapter S termination when the twenty percent
limitation is exceeded if the corporation is in its first or second year of
active business and if the amount of passive investment income for the tax
year is less than $3,000.14 Nevertheless, the passive investment income re-
strictions continue to produce harsh results.
Since the 1968 decision of Feingold v. Commissioner15 in which the IRS
refused to allow a taxpayer to deduct his real estate corporation's net oper-
ating losses, section 1372(e)(5) and the regulations promulgated thereunder
have proved to be a trap for the unsuspecting electing corporation whose
passive rental income exceeds the twenty percent statutory limit. Because
7. "Undistributed taxable income" is taxed to the subchapter S shareholders as a con-
structive dividend. Id. §§ 1373(b)-(c).
8. Id. §§ 301-307. Under § 301, the amount distributed to a noncorporate shareholder
is the amount of cash distributed plus the fair market value of any property distributed plus
the fair market value of any property distributed in kind to the shareholder less the amount
of any liabilities of the corporation assumed by the shareholder or liabilities to which the
distributed property is subject.
9. Id. § 1375(d).
10. Id. § 1374.
11. Id. §§ 1372(e)(l)-(5); for text of § 1372(e)(5), see note 25 infra.
12. Under I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C), passive investment income consists of gross receipts
received from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and, to the extent of gain there-
from, sales or exchanges of stock or securities.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266.
14. Small Business Corporations Act, Pub. L. No. 89-389, § 3(a), 80 Stat. III (1966)
(codified at I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)).
15. 49 T.C. 461 (1968). In this case, the election of the taxpayer's subchapter S corpora-
tion was terminated because of excess rental income, based on the court's conclusion that the
furnishing of certain recreational facilities and services did not constitute a significant serv-
ice within the meaning of the regulations. See text accompanying notes 47-55 infra.
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termination of the subchapter S election is retroactive rather than prospec-
tive, 16 double taxation will result if distributions are made during the year
in which termination occurs. 17 Therefore, termination also may result in
locking previously taxed income18 into the business, 19 in order to avoid a
second level of taxation of income that would otherwise have been nontax-
able to the extent of the shareholder's basis in his stock.20 Additionally,
since the disqualifying event may be first discovered several years after it
occurs, the tax deficiency may be substantial.
This Article examines the extent to which rental income constitutes pas-
sive investment income by a review of the legislative history of the sub-
chapter S provisions and an analysis of the regulations, revenue rulings,
and cases that interpret the passive investment income limitation. Sec-
ondly, this Article discusses various proposals for amendments to sub-
chapter S. These proposals are an attempt to bring predictability and
fairness to the current law that has often brought about harsh conse-
quences by causing unintended termination of the subchapter S election.
This Article concludes that the passive investment income restriction on
rental income could be abolished and other methods could be used to ef-
fectuate the apparent goal of the restriction, the prevention of abuse of
qualified pension and profit-sharing plans by funding with passive in-
come.21
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Subchapter S was enacted into the Internal Revenue Code by the Tech-
nical Amendments Act of 1958.22 The stated purpose of the provisions
was to permit small businesses to select a form of business enterprise with-
out having to consider major differences in federal tax consequences. 23
Because no hearings were held on the bill, the rationale for including the
passive investment income limitation, and specifically the six individual
16. Under I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(A), the election is terminated for the taxable year in
which the excess passive income is received.
17. See Note 4 supra.
18. A shareholder's share of previously taxed income is the accumulation of amounts
taxed to him in prior years less loss deductions previously allowed him and previous distri-
butions of previously taxed income. I.R.C. § 1375(d).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(a), T.D. 6960, 1968-2 C.B. 342.
20. Id.
21. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. STAFF REC-
OMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX RULES RELATING TO SUBCHAPTER S CORPO-
RATIONS II (Joint Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF
RECOMMENDATIONS].
22. Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606 (1958) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 1371-
1377). The subchapter S provisions were initially proposed by the Senate at the time of the
drafting of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. While later rejected by the House, the Sen-
ate proposal contained no passive investment income restriction. It did, however, require
that all shareholders be managerially active in the conduct of the business. S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621.
23. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4791.
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items of income24 constituting that category, is not entirely clear. Subse-
quently, Congress indicated that the passive investment income limita-
tion 25 was designed to "limit the availability of this [subchapter S]
treatment to small businesses actively engaged in trades or businesses. '26
Whether this pronouncement represents the real reason for the inclusion of
the passive investment income provisions, however, is questionable. The
legislative history of the subchapter S provisions strongly suggests that the
prevention of funding of qualified pension and profit-sharing plans with
income from incorporated investments might have been the primary aim
of this restriction. 27
When the subchapter S provisions were enacted in 1958, the heading for
section 1372(e)(5) was "Personal Holding Company Income." The current
denomination, "Passive Investment Income," appeared in the 1966 revi-
sion.28 The personal holding company heading gave rise to litigation in
which taxpayers argued against subchapter S termination even when a cor-
poration had what was otherwise excessive passive investment income. 29
Simply, the taxpayers maintained that since the corporation was actively
engaged in the conduct of a trade or business, it did not fall within the
24. The six individual items of income are royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities,
and proceeds from the sale or exchange of stock or securities. I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C).
25. Id. § 1372(e)(5) reads as follows:
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), an election under subsection
(a) made by a small business corporation shall terminate if, for any taxable
year of the corporation for which the election is in effect, such corporation has
gross receipts more than 20 percent of which is passive investment income.
Such termination shall be effective for the taxable year of the corporation in
which it has gross receipts of such amount, and for all succeeding taxable
years of the corporation.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to a taxable year in
which a small business corporation has gross receipts more than 20 percent of
which is passive investment income, if-
(i) such taxable year is the first taxable year in which the corporation
commenced the active conduct of any trade or business or the next suc-
ceeding taxable year; and
(ii) the amount of passive investment income for such taxable year is
less than $3,000.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "passive investment income"
means gross receipts derived from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annui-
ties, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities (gross receipts from such
sales or exchanges being taken into account for purposes of this paragraph
only to the extent of gains therefrom). Gross receipts derived from sales or
exchanges of stock or securities for purposes of this paragraph shall not in-
clude amounts received by an electing small business corporation which are
treated under section 331 (relating to corporate liquidations) as payments in
exchange for stock where the electing small business corporation owned more
than 50 percent of each class of the stock of the liquidating corporation.
26. S. REP. No. 1007, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966); H.R. REP. No. 1238, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1966).
27. See JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 21.
28. Small Business Corporations Act, Pub. L. No. 89-389, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 111 (1966)
(codified at I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)).
29. Marshall v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1975); House v. Commissioner,
453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972); Zychinski v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 950 (1973), a'd, 506 F.2d
637 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975).
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personal holding company provisions of the Code 30 and, therefore, the
subchapter S election should not terminate despite the character of the in-
come. In view of the congressional substitution of "Passive Investment
Income" for the "Personal Holding Company Income" heading, however,
construction of the passive investment income provisions with reference to
the provisions for personal holding companies is now inappropriate. The
1966 change no doubt indicated a congressional intent to establish a differ-
ent test for determining whether a business is active within the meaning of
the subchapter S provisions. 3'
III. CURRENT LAW AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. Regulations
While section 1372(e)(5)(C) of the Code includes all rents within the
passive investment income restriction, the regulations have adopted a con-
siderably more lenient approach. Under the regulations, rents do not in-
clude payments from an occupant to whom the lessor has rendered
significant services. 32 The significant services cannot be customary or
usual services, such as heat and light, but must be additional amenities
provided for the occupant's convenience, such as maid service. 33
B. Revenue Rulings
The Internal Revenue Service has issued numerous revenue rulings on
rents as passive investment income, but they have added little to the un-
derstanding of what constitutes significant services. In one such ruling the
Service has concluded that rental income derived under a share-farming
arrangement, in which the lessor participated to a material degree by per-
30. I.R.C. §§ 541-547.
31. See Osborne v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 329 (1970). See also Note, Passive Invest-
ment Income.- An Anaysis ofSubchapter S Corporations, 11 WASHBURN L.J. 97, 107 (1971).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266 provides:
Rents. The term "rents" as used in section 1372(e)(5) means amounts re-
ceived for the use of, or right to use, property (whether real or personal) of the
corporation. The term "rents" does not include payments for the use or occu-
pancy of rooms or other space where significant services are also rendered to
the occupant, such as for the use or occupancy of rooms or other quarters in
hotels, boarding houses, or apartment houses furnishing hotel services, or in
tourist homes, motor courts, or motels. Generally, services are considered ren-
dered to the occupant if they are primarily for his convenience and are other
than those usually or customarily rendered in connection with the rental of
rooms or other space for occupancy only. The supplying of maid service, for
example, constitutes such services; whereas the furnishing of heat and light,
the cleaning of public entrances, exits, stairways and lobbies, the collection of
trash, etc., are not considered as services rendered to the occupant. Payments
for the use or occupancy of entire private residences or living quarters in
duplex or multiple housing units, of offices in an office building, etc., are gen-
erally "rents" under section 1372(e)(5). Payments for the parking of
automobiles ordinarily do not constitute rents. Payments for the warehousing
of goods or for the use of personal property do not constitute rents if signifi-




forming physical work or management activity in the production of the
farm commodities, did not constitute rents for passive investment income
purposes.34 According to the facts of that ruling, the president of the lessor
corporation devoted most of his time to the share-farming activity, but the
ruling provided no specific information on the amount of time involved or
the president's salary as a percentage of corporate income or expenses. In
this ruling and in others involving real estate leasing of space only, as op-
posed to space leased for occupancy, the IRS found significant services
based only upon a showing of some services rendered, although it did not
define the level of activity required nor did it give its reasoning for the
holdings. 35 Similarly, in rulings dealing with the leasing of personal prop-
erty involving such items as barricades, 36 golf carts,37 cranes, 38 clothing, 39
motor vehicles, 40 television sets,4' and movies,42 as well as multiple
items, 43 the IRS has found that payments did not constitute rents when
any additional services beyond mere leasing were provided.44 The only
ruling in which the IRS held that passive investment income existed was
one involving the leasing of space for which the lessor corporation under-
took no other services besides the space rental.45 According to these rul-
ings,46 the only apparent requirement for a finding of significant services
involving the leasing of space or personal property is that a lessor render
any service beyond the mere leasing itself.
C. Judicial Interpretation
The issue of what constitutes significant services with respect to rental
income was first addressed in Feingold v. Commissioner.47 The petitioner's
corporation owned and operated ninety-five rental bungalows for summer
use by vacationers. The corporation fully furnished the units and con-
34. Rev. Rul. 61-112, 1961-1 C.B. 399.
35. Rev. Rul. 65-91, 1965-1 C.B. 431 (payments for grain storage with loading and pro-
tective services are not rents; payments for refrigerated warehouse storage with refrigeration,
maintenance, and attendant services are not rents; payments for use of a parking lot where
attendant parks cars are not rents). See also Rev. Rul. 76-48, 1976-1 C.B. 265 (fees for use of
a tennis and handball court with locker room, parking facilities, and lessons are not rents).
36. Rev. Rul. 65-83, 1965-1 C.B. 430, example I.
37. Id. example 2.
38. Id. example 3.
39. Rev. Rul. 65-83, 1965-1 C.B. 430.
40. Rev. Rul. 76-469, 1976-2 C.B. 252; Rev. Rul. 65-40, 1965-1 C.B. 429.
41. Rev. Rul. 70-206, 1970-1 C.B. 177.
42. Rev. Rul. 75-349, 1975-2 C.B. 349.
43. Rev. Rul. 64-232, 1964-2 C.B. 334.
44. As might be expected from the regulations' strict approach to office and apartment
building rentals, no rulings dealing with rental services rendered in tenant-occupied real
estate situations have been issued.
45. Rev. Rul. 65-91, 1965-1 C.B. 431 (payments for cotton warehouse storage with no
additional services are rents).
46. The rulings are not analytical in scope because the Service used a categorization
approach instead of applying the statute and regulations to the individual facts. Comment,
Subchapter S Eligibility--Rental Income From Real Estate and the "Passive Investment In-
come" Limitation, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 323, 327-28 (1972).
47. 49 T.C. 461 (1968).
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structed a paved, lighted, and fenced-in patio as a common recreational
area for tenants' use only. The corporation also provided tables, chairs,
playing cards, and bingo games in the patio area and occasionally held
parties for the children for which it supplied hats and prizes. Several times
during the summer, the corporation held parties for the adults and sup-
plied small amounts of food and beverages, although participants occa-
sionally bought additional refreshments.
The court concluded that the services performed for the tenants were not
significant within the meaning of the regulations. 48 First, the court held
that providing a furnished recreational area or recreational equipment did
not constitute supplying services and that the mere right to use property
was not equivalent to providing services. 49 Moreover, the court found in-
sufficient evidence to establish significant services of the corporation with
respect to the bingo games or children's parties. 50 While it did find that
the corporation had sponsored several weekend parties each summer, the
court concluded that such activities did not constitute significant services
within the meaning of the regulations. 5' This conclusion was based on a
finding that the taxpayer had not demonstrated that the parties were an
important factor in inducing rentals or in improving the tenants' vaca-
tions.52 The court further found that the evidence did not establish that
many tenants had participated nor that such functions constituted a signifi-
cant portion of the corporation's operations. 53 To buttress this conclusion,
the court noted that the proven yearly expenditures that did constitute
services under the regulations amounted to only. 15 percent of the corpora-
tion's annual receipts. 54 While the court found this figure too low to estab-
lish significance, it gave no indication of the required percentage. The
court's failure to define precisely what constitutes significant services is
clearly unsatisfactory. Moreover, the inducment of rentals and improv-
ment of tenants' vacations, which the court seemed to use as a new stan-
dard, are, at best, highly subjective and somewhat artificial tests because
they do not describe the nature of the services, but rather emphasize a
collateral consideration of the consequences of the services,55 an emphasis
that is not found in the regulations.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the decision is the court's state-
ment that the services furnished by the corporation did not compare to
those furnished by a hotel or motel, specifically maid service. 56 Because
summer rentals such as those in Feingold might differ from hotels or mo-
48. ld. at 466-67.
49. Id. at 465.
50. Id. at 466.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 467.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. From the standpoint of corporate effort or expense, insignificant services might well
stimulate rentals or improve the quality of occupancy, while highly significant services
would not necessarily achieve these results.
56. 49 T.C. at 467; see note 32 supra.
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tels with respect to length of guests' occupancy, number of occupants per
unit, and number of unit facilities provided, the need for maid service
could be considerably less than that in a motel or hotel. Not only is the
maid service example of dubious relevance, but it also appears to represent
an exclusive and dispositive reference to an example in the regulations that
is offered for illustrative, rather than exhaustive, purposes. Instead of us-
ing an analytical approach to the language in the statute and the regula-
tions, the court apparently chose to evaluate leased space dwellings against
a standard that, in practical application, would virtually preclude a finding
of significant services.
The concept of significant services related to leased space also was ad-
dressed in the case of Bramlette Building Corp. v. Commissioner,57 in which
the corporation's only income was from renting parking space and an of-
fice building that housed, in addition to other tenants, a barber shop, drug
store, and lunch counter. To maintain the building, the corporation
employed a ten-person staff, consisting of three maids, two porters, two
elevator operators, a secretary, a night watchman, and a maintenance engi-
neer.5 8 In addition to the ordinary maintenance services normally pro-
vided by a lessor, the corporation allowed its maintenance engineer, when
time permitted, to repair machines, furniture, and furnishings belonging to
tenants.
The petitioner first contended that its efforts in obtaining leases with the
barber shop, drug store, and lunch counter were for the convenience of its
other tenants and not services usually or customarily furnished to tenants
of office space. The court dismissed this argument, however, by stating
that "the mere leasing of space to a third party, who performs services for
the other tenants of the office building, does not constitute the providing of
[significant] services within the meaning of the regulations."59 The court
further concluded that services rendered to tenants by third party lessees
could not be considered services rendered by the lessor.60
Based on the facts in the case, the first conclusion is undoubtedly correct
because the execution of the barber shop, drug store, and lunch counter
leases was not primarily for the convenience of the other tenants. The
holding concerning third parties, however, appears questionable. The
principle that significant services must be furnished by the lessor rather
than by a third party is without support in either the statute or the regula-
tions.61 The regulations provide that "generally, services are considered
rendered to the occupant if they are primarily for his convenience and are
other than those usually or customarily rendered in connection with the
57. 52 T.C. 200 (1969), afl'd, 424 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1970).
58. The maids cleaned offices as well as common areas, and the porters assisted tenants
in moving into the building as well as in changing offices within the building.
59. 52 T.C. at 204-05.
60. Id. at 205.
61. The regulations use the language "where significant services are also rendered to the
occupant" and "services are considered rendered to the occupant." Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-
4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266.
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rental of rooms or other space for occupancy only."' 62 Therefore, the better
reason for excluding the third party lessees' activities from the significant
services category in this case would be that such activities were not services
as defined in the regulations because they were not rendered in connection
with the rental but were merely incidental to the occupancy. 63 Not only
does this approach appear to reflect the intent of the language of the regu-
lations, but it also avoids uncertainty when a third party does render serv-
ices in connection with the rental.
The petitioner's alternative argument in support of a finding of signifi-
cant services was based on the repairs of the tenants' personal property.
While the court conceded that the repairs on tenants' machines and furni-
ture were rendered in connection with the rental and were not usual or
customary with respect to office space, it nevertheless concluded that the
services were not significant."4 With minimal discussion, the court ostensi-
bly based this finding on a lack of evidence concerning the number of
tenants benefiting from the repairs and the amount of time that the main-
tenance engineers spent on repairs.65 In reality, the court simply inferred
that the repair services were not substantial in nature:
In all probability they were insignificant because the maintenance en-
gineer testified that he made such repairs only "when he had time."
And, in view of his other duties relating to the air conditioning, the
heating, and the electrical equipment of the building, the inference we
draw is that he had little time to devote to such repair services.66
Unfortunately, the court gave no suggestion of the amount of repair serv-
ices, either from the standpoint of employee time involved or aggregate
tenant benefit, that would have warranted a finding of significant services.
One other aspect of the Tax Court's decision deserves attention. In ad-
dressing the petitioner's contention that a corporation owning and leasing
office space in an office building is not precluded by either statute or regu-
lation from making a subchapter S election, the court observed that "as a
practical matter the gross receipts requirement of section 1372(e)(5) makes
it very difficult for a corporation whose only asset is an office building to
qualify for subchapter S treatment. ' 67 While this statement is not patently
incorrect, it does indicate a categorization approach68 and an undue con-
cern for the nature of the business involved, rather than the nature and
extent of services rendered in accordance with the approach of the regula-
tions. In fact the Fifth Circuit, in affirming the Tax Court's decision, con-
cluded that the repair services performed by the maintenance engineer
were not services within the contemplation of the regulations because the
62. Id.
63. The court found that no portion of the other tenants' rentals was paid either for the
corporation's efforts in obtaining the barber shop, drug store, or lunch counter or for the




67. Id. at 203.
68. See Comment, supra note 46, at 326.
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language "speaks primarily of room services rendered by hotels, motels,
and like businesses. ' 69 Because, as a practical matter, lessors of office
building space would rarely, if ever, furnish the same type of room services
rendered by hotels and motels, the court of appeals' interpretation of the
regulation is considerably more restrictive than that of the Tax Court,
which holds that office building rental income can, in theory at least, avoid
passive investment income characterization when significant services have
been rendered.
Another case considering rental income as passive investment income is
City Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner. 70 The petitioner corporation owned a
farmers' market, involving two long-roofed structures housing produce
and flower vendors as well as other retail and service businesses. The cor-
poration employed only two full-time employees, a maintenance man and
his assistant, who maintained and repaired building equipment and com-
mon areas and made requested alterations to the tenants' booths, charging
for materials only when the item repaired was not physically attached to
the building. Additionally, the corporation furnished pest control services,
listed its tenants' services in the Yellow Pages, and maintained a large ad-
vertising sign for the entire market, all without charge.
The court of appeals concluded that these services were not significant
because they were either excluded by the specific language of the regula-
tions7' or, in the case of pest control and occasional alterations, were so
similar to those excluded by the regulations that they were deemed not
significant by implication.72 The court prefaced its analysis of the signifi-
cant services question with a reference to the hotel-motel room service lan-
guage of the regulations and then concluded that the corporation's
activities did not fit the definition of services contained in the regula-
tions. 73
This rather formalistic approach, however, amounts to little more than a
corporate activity test; a corporation must supply hotel or motel-type room
services, as set forth in the regulations, in order to avoid characterization
of its income as passive investment income. This approach not only fails
to address the nature or extent of the services rendered, but effectively pre-
vents office or commercial building rental activity from ever qualifying for
subchapter S status. Moreover, this treatment militates against the lan-
guage of the regulations that provides that although entire living unit or
office space payments are generally rents for passive investment income
purposes, an exception exists when the lessor provides significant serv-
ices. 74 Certainly, this language in the regulations should not be interpreted
69. Bramlette Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1970).
70. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1055 (1969), a fd, 433 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1970).
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266, excludes from the cate-
gory of services rendered to the occupant such activities as the supplying of heat and light,
the cleaning of common areas, and the collection of trash.
72. 433 F.2d 1240, 1242 (6th Cir. 1970).
73. Id. at 1241-42.
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266.
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automatically to denominate office building rentals as passive investment
income.
Another troubling aspect of the decision is the reliance of both the Tax
Court75 and the court of appeals 76 on the lack of a formal agreement for
the performance of any services in support of their conclusions that signifi-
cant services had not been rendered by the corporation. Such a require-
ment appears neither in the statute nor in the regulations. No rationale is
offered for this conclusion, and none appears compelling. Significance of
services, Whether measured by the number of tenants benefited or the scale
of services rendered, as suggested by the Tax Court,77 can be ascertained
without reference to any formal contract. If the problem were simply one
of lack of evidence, the mere production of formal agreements would not
be dispositive of the significant services issue, but would serve as no more
than a starting point for the inquiry.78 A determination of whether serv-
ices that are not customary or usual are rendered to an occupant, primarily
for his convenience, in connection with the rental cannot be made merely
by reference to a formal contract.
Likewise, the Tax Court's analysis of the level of services provided by
the corporation is not persuasive. In support of its conclusion that the
scale of services rendered was not great, the court pointed out that only
two maintenance men served the tenants' repair needs. 79 As noted earlier,
however, the corporation had only these two full-time employees. The fact
that all of the company's employees, irrespective of their absolute num-
bers, participated in rendering a given service ought to have supported,
rather than precluded, a finding of significance.
Furthermore, the court of appeals' decision to treat repairs of tenants'
property and pest control spraying as excluded by the language of the reg-
ulations80 seems unjustified. Because the list of excluded items8 1 is obvi-
ously intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, the services here in
question should not be excluded from the significant services category.
The regulations appear to exclude services strictly on the basis of whether
they are customary and usual for occupied space rentals. Because the
opinion does not indicate whether these services were customary or usual
for such rentals, the court should have found them insignificant simply
because of insufficient evidence, rather than insignificant because excluded
by the regulations.
Finally, while the court of appeals found that advertising in the tele-
phone directory Yellow Pages and the maintenance of a common billboard
75. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1058.
76. 433 F.2d at 1241.
77. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1058.
78. Under the Tax Court's test, the amount of the rental payment attributable to such
services, the number of tenants involved, or the amount of employee effort would still need
to be determined independently of the existence of a formal contract.
79. 28 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1058.
80. 433 F.2d at 1242.
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266. For text of regulation,
see note 32 supra.
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were not customary and usual services rendered with commercial office
space, it merely stated, without further explanation, that "by themselves
they cannot be of the 'significance' required by the Regulation. '82 Unfor-
tunately, taxpayers are left to speculate what additional services would be
required to transform advertising and billboard maintenance into signifi-
cant services.
In H & L. Reid, Inc. v. United States83 the corporation owned and
leased an office building predominantly occupied by physicians and den-
tists. It provided, without additional charge, mail delivery service upon
request, a lunch-break area for tenants' employees, emergency janitorial
service, and extensive intra-office remodeling. Despite these services the
court rejected the taxpayer's argument in favor of significant services and
thus disallowed the subchapter S election. Although the court pointed out
that very few maintenance men performed the services in question, 84 this
emphasis on the absolute numbers of employees involved appears dubious
because the opinion does not reveal how many employees were employed
by the corporation. If, as in City Markets, all of a small number of em-
ployees rendered a service, that fact should support a finding of signifi-
cance. Therefore, the appropriate inquiry ought to focus upon the
percentage of employees, or perhaps the category of employees providing
the service, rather than upon absolute numbers alone.
The court in Reid purportedly relied upon City Markets for its conclu-
sion that the appropriate test for significant services is whether the corpo-
ration is "still primarily a landlord, ' 85 but this language appears neither in
the City Markets decision nor in the statute or regulations. Aside from its
lack of legal support, this approach is encumbered with inherent difficulty
of construction. The court does not indicate whether "primarily" means
more than fifty percent or is to be determined by reference to the number
or percentage of employees involved or by the ratio of service expenses to
gross receipts. The taxpayer is left without a satisfactory answer to these
questions and cannot determine with any certainty whether he is qualified
to make or maintain the subchapter S election.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the decision in Reid is the court's
conclusion that "it is not the amount of services rendered, but the nature or
type of services rendered that determines whether the services are 'substan-
tial.' ",86 In addition to its internal inconsistency, 87 this proposition also
fails because of a lack of support in the cases cited by the court. Bramlette
should not be construed as holding that the amount of services rendered is
82. 433 F.2d at 1242.
83. 375 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
84. Id. at 1101.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. A service rendered only once or twice, or involving only a minimal expenditure of
funds or employee effort, would arguably never be characterized as significant, simply be-




irrelevant to the significant services inquiry.88 Instead, the court of appeals
in Bramlette simply held, and correctly so, that the obtaining of leases with
certain tenants did not constitute the rendering of services to the other ten-
ants within the meaning of the regulations. 89 Furthermore, the Tax
Court's opinion in Bramlette strongly indicates that the quantum of serv-
ices rendered is appropriate to the significant services inquiry, by empha-
sizing: "The record is silent as to how much time the maintenance
engineer spent repairing the tenants' machines or furniture or how many
tenants availed themselves of such services." 90 Moreover, the other cases
dealing with this issue, Feingold9' and City Markets,92 both made clear
that, in addition to the nature of the service, value and level of service were
important factors in determining significance.
The issue of significant services was first presented in connection with
personal property rental income in Winn v. Commissioner.93 The petition-
ers' corporation derived more than twenty percent of its gross receipts from
leasing barges. The taxpayers argued that certain activities, ostensibly per-
formed by the corporation, involving cleaning and maintaining barges in a
seaworthy condition, the delivery of barges when needed, and the mainte-
nance of cross-charter agreements and insurance, constituted significant
services. According to the court, however, cross-charter agreements and
insurance failed the significant services test simply because of evidentiary
insufficiency.94 Additionally, the court held that cleaning and general
barge repair were not significant services because expenditures for them, as
a percentage of total barge charter income, were "certainly not signifi-
cant,"' 95 but the court offered no guidance as to the requisite level of expen-
diture. Moreover, the court concluded that the cleaning and repair
activities and barge delivery services all failed the significant services test
for the additional reason that they were neither rendered nor arranged by
the corporation whose subchapter S status was at issue. In this instance,
the court found that an affiliated corporation had made all significant
barge rental arrangements, thereby precluding a finding of significant serv-
ices by the lessor:
To comply with the regulations, a corporation must actively engage
in the production of rentals; it must provide or make arrangements for
significant services. Herein, the services provided or arranged for by
Security [affiliate] cannot be attributed to Wagren [subchapter S cor-
poration]. Significant services within the meaning of the regulations
must be rendered by the corporation seeking to qualify under sub-
88. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
89. 424 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1970).
90. 52 T.C. at 205.
91. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
92. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
93. 67 T.C. 499 (1976), aff'd, 595 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1979).
94. 67 T.C. at 515.
95. Id. Barge charter income for the tax year of termination amounted to $218,053,
while the maximum amount shown in the record for barge cleaning and repairs totaled
$7,960. Therefore, the expenditures for the services constituted approximately 3.7% of re-
lated income.
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chapter S.96
Although this prohibition against qualifying services being rendered by
third parties apparently has become engrafted upon the subchapter S regu-
lations, its validity remains questionable. As noted earlier, the third party
services in Bramlette were not rendered in connection with the rental, but
were at most incidental.97 Further, the lessees' activities that were said to
benefit the other tenants resulted in no expense to the subchapter S corpo-
ration. To the contrary, in Winn the barge cleaning, repair, and delivery
services were provided in connection with barge rentals, and the record
showed that, while arrangements for these services were made by the affili-
ate, the expenses were borne by the subchapter S corporation. 98 The Tax
Court, however, gave only a cursory discussion of this point, concluding
that "[tlhe income earned and expense incurred by Wagren amounted to
little more than intercompany book allocations made at the direction of
petitioner, Mr. Flowers, and other employees of Security." 99
In reality, the third party analysis in Winn misconstrued the Bramlette
holding, which is correct on the facts of that case, and translated the lim-
ited proscription against third party services enunciated in Bramlette into
an absolute prohibition against any third party services, even though the
significant services in Winn were rendered by the affiliate under an agree-
ment between the subchapter S corporation and the third party affiliate.1o°
In view of this working arrangement between affiliates, the court miscon-
strued the intent of the regulations by concluding that the services did not
result from arrangements made by the lessor or that the activities of one
corporation could not be attributed to another affiliated corporation.,'
Interestingly, the court in Winn made no reference to Revenue Ruling
65-40102 or Revenue Ruling 76-469,103 discussing third party services in
personal property leasing situations. In the first ruling, the electing corpo-
ration leased motor vehicles on a short-term basis, supplying some of the
servicing through its own employees and some through independent repair
shops.'°4 In the second ruling, the corporation leased motor vehicles on a
long-term basis. In addition to attendant repair and leasing services per-
formed by it, the subchapter S corporation arranged to have repairs
performed by unspecified third parties. 10 5 In each case, the Service con-
cluded, without any mention of a third party services issue, that the lease
96. Id. at 516 (citing Bramlette Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 200 (1969), afl'd,
424 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1970)).
97. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
98. 67 T.C. at 505-06.
99. Id. at 516.
100. The pertinent language of the regulations simply provides that "[tihe term .'rents'
does not include payments ...where significant services are also rendered to the occu-
pant." Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266. No reference is made to
who must provide these services.
101. 67 T.C. at 516.
102. 1965-1 C.B. 429.
103. 1976-2 C.B. 252.
104. Rev. Rul. 65-40, 1965-1 C.B. 429.
105. Rev. Rul. 76-469, 1976-2 C.B. 252.
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payments did not constitute passive investment income. This apparent in-
consistency between the holding in Winn and the Service's analysis in the
above revenue rulings remains unclarified.
The significant services issue was subsequently addressed in the context
of personal property leasing in Lausmann v. Commissioner, 106 in which the
subchapter S corporation was engaged in the financing, marketing, and
sale of forest products. To facilitate the operation of the business of one of
its customers, an affiliated corporation, the subchapter S corporation
agreed to construct, lease, and operate a wood veneer drying machine on
the customer's premises. Subsequently, the customer agreed to provide la-
bor and supplies for the dryer's operation. While some of the customer's
employees were utilized in operating the dryer, the foreman of the entire
drying operation was at all times directly employed by, and responsible to,
the subchapter S corporation.
When a dispute arose as to subchapter S qualification, the taxpayer and
the Internal Revenue Service stipulated that amounts paid to the sub-
chapter S corporation for drying were rents and that significant services
had been rendered. The only issue to be decided was who had performed
the services. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that
the subchapter S corporation did not render the services simply because
employees of the customer actually operated the dryer. Based solely upon
the foreman's total control over the drying operation 107 and his undisputed
employment by the subchapter S corporation, the court concluded that the
subchapter S corporation, rather than the customer, had performed the
significant services.' 0 8 In basing its conclusion solely on these facts the
Tax Court in Lausmann apparently embraced its holding in Winn that
proscribes significant services by anyone but the subchapter S corpora-
tion. 10 9 Lausmann offers no insight into the level of activity required to
qualify as significant services, because that fact was stipulated to by the
parties.
Two recent cases, one dealing with leasing space and the other dealing
with leasing personal property, exemplify the Tax Court's continued reluc-
tance to find that significant services have been provided. In McIlhinney v.
Commissioner" 10 the issue of significant services was raised in connection
with rentals derived from a shopping mall. The taxpayer's contentions
that significant services had been provided were rejected, causing termina-
106. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1740 (1978).
107. The foreman directed placement of the veneer in the dryer, control and mainte-
nance of the dryer, removal of the veneer from the dryer, as well as counting, grading, and
packing the dried sheets of veneer.
108. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1744.
109. 67 T.C. at 516. The Lausmann court noted: "If [the lessee corporation] performed
the services, then the rental income [the subchapter S corporation] received is passive invest-
ment income." 37 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1744. For a construction of the third party holding of
the Bramlelle decision similar to that offered by this writer, see Note, supra note 31, at 102.
See also Wilson, Passive Invesiment Income.- When Will It Terminate Subchapter S Qualfi-
cations, 40 J. TAX. 54, 56 (1974).
110. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 554 (1979).
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tion of subchapter S status and preventing the pass-through of net operat-
ing losses to the shareholders. The Tax Court first concluded that such
services as providing heating and air conditioning, snow and trash re-
moval, and the cleaning and maintenance of public areas were excluded
by the regulations, either directly or by implication, or were customary or
usual to similar rental premises. I " ' The other services provided by the cor-
poration, promotional activities involving car raffles, band concerts, and
Santa Claus visits, were held not significant on the ground that the record
did not establish that the services were other than customary or usual for
malls. 1 2 The court also noted that the record did not demonstrate the
frequency of the activities or the amount of expenditures or employee ef-
forts involved." 3 Additionally, the taxpayers' providing of the security
force and mall manager also was not significant because the court found
that the taxpayers had failed to carry their burden of proof with respect to
whether these services were actually rendered to the occupant as required
by the regulations. 114 Finally, the court noted that, for the tax year in
question, the subchapter S corporation bore under the lease provisions ap-
proximately two percent of the mall's operating cost, including the cost of
the security forces. The court concluded that "[wle fail to see how SRSC's
[subchapter S corporation] payment of approximately 2 percent of the cost
of security services could in any way be considered significant."" 5 The
court again failed to suggest what percentage of expenditure would have
qualified as significant.
In Thompson v. Commissioner 16 the subchapter S corporation rented
prerecorded video cassettes to cable television stations. The petitioner ar-
gued that it had rendered significant services by shipping the cassettes to
television stations. The court rejected this contention on the ground that
the petitioner had failed to carry its burden of proof.' '7 In addition, the
court emphasized: "[I1t is clear to the Court that this shipping service ren-
dered by Cable Vision [subchapter S corporation] is a service that is 'usu-
ally and customarily' rendered in similar rental businesses. Thus, we
conclude that Cable Vision did not render 'significant services' to G.E. in
connection with the license agreement." 'l 8 The holding is clearly errone-
ous to the extent that the court based its finding of no significant services
on its understanding' 19 that the services must not be usually and customa-
rily rendered in similar rental businesses. As contained in the regulations,
II1. Id. at 557.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 558.
115. Id.
116. 73 T.C. 878 (1980).
117. Id. at 892.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. The court apparently believed that the services should not be usual or customary
because it stated:
Thus, if a corporation leases personal property and renders services prima-
rily for the convenience of the lessee other than those "usually or customarily"
rendered in connection with such a lease and such services are "significant" in
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the language "usually and customarily" refers only to services rendered to
an occupant in connection with the rental of rooms or other space for oc-
cupancy only.120 Because the lessee of personal property cannot properly
be called an occupant of a room or other space, the court's interpretation
of the regulations is clearly incorrect. The regulations indicate that signifi-
cant services should be the only test for personal property rental income.
All of the decided cases dealing with personal property rental income have
so held,' 2 but the court simply misread Winn. Winn clearly adopted sig-
nificant services as the only test for services provided in personal property
rentals. 22 The language in Winn cited by the court in Thompson 23 is
actually a reference to the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Bramlelte, 24 a
case that dealt with real, not personal property. Accordingly, this portion
of the Thompson holding appears to be of questionable precedential value.
Nevertheless, the Thompson case does point out several glaring deficien-
cies in the regulations. The Commissioner permits looking behind the re-
ceipts to determine whether the business is active or passive only in cases
involving rental income, but not in cases involving other items that consti-
tute passive investment income under the Code. 25 Further, for no appar-
ent reason, the applicable standard distinguishes between real and
personal property. In the case of real property, an unexplained distinction
is made between the leasing of space only, such as for warehousing or
parking lot rentals, and space rented for occupancy. The "usual or cus-
tomary" standard does not apply to the leasing of space or personal prop-
erty, even though significance is supposed to be the appropriate test for all
categories. Moreover, no demonstrable relationship exists between
whether services are usual or customary and whether a business is active or
passive. Congress has stated 26 that the rationale for the passive invest-
ment income restriction is based on the latter determination. An active
real estate corporation rendering otherwise significant services apparently
will not qualify for subchapter S status simply because similar businesses
render like services. While beyond the scope of this Article, these ques-
tions are raised to point out that, while the judicial decisions have failed to
apply the subchapter S statutory provisions and regulations adequately
and consistently, the interstices in the regulations themselves have given
rise to much of the uncertainty surrounding termination of the election
through excess rental income.
nature, then the income received by the lessor will not constitute "rents" for
the purposes of section 1372(e)(5).
Id. at 890.
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266.
121. See notes 93-109 supra and accompanying text.
122. 67 T.C. at 514.
123. 73 T.C. at 890.
124. 424 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1970).
125. Royalties, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities
are passive income items. I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C).
126. S. REP. No. 1007, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966); H.R. REP. No. 1238, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1966).
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A. Alternative Tests for Passive Investment Income
From Real Estate Rentals
Congress has stated that the passive investment income limitation was
intended to prevent the utilization of subchapter S status by corporations
not actively engaged in a trade or business.127 Therefore, if the regulations
are to carry out the legislative intent, they should differentiate between
those corporations that merely passively invest in real estate, without un-
dertaking significant and ongoing rental activity, and those owning and
actively managing rental real estate. Congress has shown no intent to pre-
clude subchapter S status to active corporations, and no legitimate tax pol-
icy reason is apparent for a distinction between an active real estate
business and any other active trade or business. Furthermore, the com-
plexity of the termination provisions in conjunction with the vagueness of
the decided cases makes termination highly probable if the subchapter S
corporation's major activity is the renting of space for occupancy. Finally,
this likelihood of unintended loss of subchapter S status may occur despite
the fact that subchapter S real estate corporations are clearly permissible
under the regulations if significant services have been rendered and despite
the fact that the significant services test under the regulations is unaccount-
ably less stringent for rents derived from personal property and warehous-
ing activity than from rented real estate. If predictability of result in the
application of tax laws is desirable, then the current version of the sub-
chapter S provisions with respect to rental income from real estate has
failed to achieve that goal. Accordingly, the proposals that follow are at-
tempts to provide some degree of certainty of result, with the concomitant
opportunity for informed tax planning.
One alternative to the significant services test utilized by the courts is
that intimated in Feingold and Winn, that is, one based on an objective
percentage of corporate receipts expended for related rental services. Spe-
cifically, business activity would be determined by reference to the ratio of
cost of services rendered to the occupant within the meaning of the regula-
tions to total rental receipts. If the qualifying expenses met or exceeded
the prescribed figure, 128 then significant services would have been pro-
vided, thereby precluding a finding of passive investment income and
preventing termination of the election due to excess rental income. Never-
theless, evidentiary problems of whether the services were customary and
usual and whether they were primarily for the occupant's convenience
would remain. 129 Therefore, an even more mechanical test would be de-
sirable.
One commentator has suggested a test that would compare the total of
127. JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 21, at II.
128. While derivation of the percentage is beyond the scope of this Article, the Commis-
sioner might set such a figure in the regulations.
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266.
[Vol. 34
RENTAL INCOME
all business expenses to gross receipts 130 in a manner analogous to the per-
sonal holding company provisions.'31 This approach would tend to ensure
that the corporation's activity as a whole constituted an active trade or
business, thereby satisfying the congressionally stated purpose for the pas-
sive investment income limitation, 132 and a factual inquiry into whether
the rental services were rendered to the occupant would be unnecessary. If
total corporate business expenditures met the required percentage, 133 the
rents would not constitute passive investment income. This test is rela-
tively simple, and the tax consequences of the corporate business activities
would be reasonably predictable. Although this test would ensure that the
business as a whole was actively pursued, it would not prevent an other-
wise active corporation from having a strictly passive real estate invest-
ment as part of its business activities, and for this reason, would no doubt
be vigorously resisted by the Service.
Perhaps the test most clearly reflecting the stated legislative rationale for
the passive investment income limitation would be a percentage standard
only for rental receipts and service expenditures. 134 For example, a per-
centage could be derived by comparing all rental service expenditures to
gross rental receipts. If the percentage were at or above some minimum
level to establish business activity, 35 the passive investment income limita-
tion would not be violated and a determination of significant services
would not be required. The objective factors of a test of this type would
permit reasonable certainty of result, while preventing a corporation from
holding significant passive income investments in addition to its active
trade or business.
Other approaches have been suggested, 136 such as determining passive
investment income strictly by reference to the personal holding company
provisions, or determining significant services through a qualitative analy-
sis of the activities of the business. Under the latter approach, for example,
a certain activity would be deemed significant, even if it were customary or
usual for similar rentals, when the corporation performed the activity fre-
quently or used a large number of employees to conduct it. Neither ap-
proach, however, appears acceptable. The 1966 amendment to subchapter
S clearly indicated that business activity for passive investment income
purposes was not to be determined by reference to the personal holding
company provisions, and this approach is therefore clearly incompatible
with the legislative intent. Additionally, the qualitative method does not
appear workable because it lacks objective factors and would not eliminate
the current uncertainty. Although this approach would be superior to the
130. See Comment, supra note 46, at 330.
131. I.R.C. §§ 541-547.
132. JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 21, at 11.
133. Again, derivation of the appropriation minimum percentage is not suggested in this
Article.
134. Expenditures necessarily would have to be limited to service expenditures in order
to rule out strictly passive items such as taxes, loan carrying charges, and capital items.
135. See Comment, supra note 46, at 329.
136. Id.
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significant services test now employed by the courts because it would actu-
ally focus on business activity, it would require resolution of the question
on a case by case basis, thus affording little opportunity for tax planning.
B. Deletion of Rents From the Passive Investment Income Category
The legislative history of subchapter S offers no insight into why the
particular items of passive investment income were selected for inclusion
within that category. 137 The most recent legislative pronouncement deal-
ing with the passive investment income restriction indicated only that the
provision was intended to limit subchapter S status to small but active
trades or businesses not having large amounts of passive income.138 While
the 1966 amendment dropped the heading "Personal Holding Company
Income" and substituted "Passive Investment Income," presumably be-
cause Congress deemed the latter the more appropriate test of whether a
corporation was actively engaged in a trade or business, it did not indicate
the rationale for inclusion of rents in the passive investment income.
One inconsistency in the formulation of the passive investment income
limitation in the regulations can be seen readily from a brief examination
of the six categories of proscribed income. While the mere receipt of roy-
alties, dividends, annuities, or the proceeds from the sale or exchange of
stock or securities generally involves no trade or business activity, the re-
ceipt of rental income, especially from real estate, does involve business
activity.139 At a minimum, the lessor corporation would engage in book-
keeping and record keeping activity, check writing or cash disbursements,
advertising and taxpaying, as well as maintenance and general manage-
ment activity, unless paid management is retained to perform these serv-
ices. Based upon these distinctions alone, rental income should not be
treated as passive investment income as a matter of course. In fact, com-
mentators generally agree that the rental of real estate constitutes a trade
or business when considerable, continuous, and regular management or
rental activities are performed.140 Real estate rentals may have been
lumped into the passive investment income category simply because real
estate is often held for investment, without any consideration of the fact
that this type of activity has much of the indicia of an active trade or busi-
ness. If the purpose of the passive investment income provision is solely to
require business activity for subchapter S corporations, then the rents cate-
137. See text accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
138. S. REP. No. 1007, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966).
139. The sixth category, "interest," may also be distinguished from the other, clearly
passive types. For example, in Marshall v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 242 (1973), afd, 510
F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1975), the corporation derived excess passive investment income from
interest from its small loan business, thus terminating the subchapter S election. The corpo-
ration was quite active, however, in the small loans business during the tax year in question.
140. Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguished From "Conduct" of a Rental Real Estate Busi-
ness, 25 TAX LAW. 317 (1971-1972); see Lourie, Subchapter S After Six Years of Operation.:
An Analysis of Advantages and Defects, 22 J. TAX. 166, 170 (1965). See also S. REP. No.
1241, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1964).
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gory of proscribed income could be deleted without defeating the congres-
sional purpose for the limitation.
Another inconsistency involves the language of the regulations that set
forth the activities constituting significant services. 141 Maid services con-
stitute such services and therefore business activity, but the cleaning of
common areas and the collection of trash do not. 142 Moreover, while serv-
ices rendered to occupants of office buildings and private residences must
not be customary or usual in order to be significant, services provided in
warehousing 143 and space rental' 4 are not so restricted. Likewise, the
"customary and usual" limitation does not apply to rentals from hotels,
motels, and similar establishments. 145
While the language of the regulations dealing with rent appears more
liberal than the statutory provision, which bars excess rents entirely,' 46 in
fact, the regulations have only added to the confusion of the already com-
plicated subchapter S provisions. The spate of litigation arising over unin-
tended subchapter S terminations from rental income suggests that the
regulations, in combination with the complexity of the statutory provi-
sions, have misled taxpayers as to the propriety of real estate rental income
under subchapter S.
While this problem has proved most acute for real estate rentals, passive
investment income issues have also arisen for personal property leasing
and for rents derived from non-occupied real estate, such as parking lot
rentals and warehouse fees. Even though the question of significant serv-
ices for these categories is rendered moot by the provisions of the regula-
tions and revenue rulings, the issue of third party services, as illustrated by
Winn, remains. Therefore, deletion of personal property rents from the
passive investment income limitation would remove the uncertainty that
now exists.
C. Repeal of the Passive Investment Income Provisions
The most radical, yet most equitable, proposal for removing the defi-
ciencies of the passive investment income restrictions would be to abolish
those provisions entirely. The rationale for the limitation has been ques-
tioned almost from the inception of the subchapter S provisions. For ex-
ample, one commentator has contended that personal holding companies
have been excluded from subchapter S treatment, through the passive in-
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266. For the full text of the
regulation, see note 32 supra.
142. Treas. Reg. 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Maid service is usual and customary in such establishments. Yet according to
Treas. Reg. § i.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), maid services are significant. Inexplicably, the usual and
customary language must not apply to hotels and motels.
146. Under I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C), rent is a category of passive investment income, with
no exception provided. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi), T.D. 7414, 1976-1 C.B. 266, how-
ever, excludes rents from passive investment income where significant services are rendered
to the occupants.
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come restriction, simply because the Treasury Department has tradition-
ally desired to punish personal holding companies. 147
Another writer, with a less extreme view, holds that abolishing the pas-
sive investment income provisions will enhance the effect of the personal
holding company provisions by ensuring that all income of the electing
corporation is taxed currently to the shareholders.148 A third commentator
has noted that because the distinction between active and passive invest-
ments is difficult to draw and because it serves no purpose within the sub-
chapter S framework, the passive investment income restriction should be
removed if employee fringe benefit abuse is otherwise precluded. 49 An-
other argument against the passive investment income limitation can be
directed against the inclusive statutory list of only six categories of pro-
scribed income, with no apparent reason for limiting passive investment
income to these six items alone. A corporation that receives all of its in-
come from owning personal service contracts not permitted under the Per-
sonal Holding Company provisions' 5" of the Code would be a personal
holding company not actively engaged in the conduct of a trade or busi-
ness within the usual meaning of that term. Such a corporation, however,
apparently would be able to elect and maintain subchapter S status, simply
because personal service contract income is not listed under the categories
of passive investment income. Additionally, a corporation whose sole ac-
tivity is to hold real estate for resale apparently would also qualify for
subchapter S treatment because receipts derived from the sale or exchange
of real estate are not proscribed by section 1372(e)(5) or the regulations,
regardless of the level of activity of the corporation. Such distinctions be-
tween these types of income appear arbitrary and do not foster the under-
lying purpose of the subchapter S provisions.
If the primary purpose for enacting subchapter S were to eliminate con-
sideration of federal income tax consequences when choosing a form of
business, then the complexity of the termination provisions and the unin-
tended terminations by themselves would weigh in favor of the repeal of
the passive investment income restrictions.' 5 ' One thoughtful analysis of
the subchapter S passive investment income restriction maintains that the
only real reason for its inclusion has nothing to do with passive investment
income per se, but relates to the prevention of funding of qualified pension
147. Borsook, Few Personal Holding Companies Will Qualifyfor Subchapter S Election,
10 J. TAX. 19 (1959).
148. Driscoll, Subchapter S-Its Role in the Tax Laws, 3 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM
1723, 1730 (1959).
149. Price, Subchapter S-Some Policy Questions, 3 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1731,
1732 (1959).
150. I.R.C. § 543(a)(7).
15 I. While this Article deals primarily with rents as passive investment income, litigation
has also proliferated over unintended subchapter S termination through receipt of the other
forms of passive investment income as well. See, e.g., Swank & Son v. United States, 362 F.
Supp. 897 (D. Mont. 1973) (oil and gas royalties), aft'd, 522 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975); Zychin-
ski v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 950 (1973) (sale of securities), aftd, 506 F.2d 637 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975); House v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 533
(1970) (interest), rev'd, 453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972).
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and profit-sharing plans with passive investment income.' 52 This assertion
seems to be well-founded because no passive investment income limitation
appeared in the unsuccessful 1954 subchapter S proposal, which required
all shareholders to be active participants in the business. 53 Moreover, the
1954 proposal provided that subchapter S shareholders were ineligible for
qualified pension and profit-sharing plans.' 54 The conclusion is further
supported by a recent congressional staff report that maintains that pre-
vention of abuse of qualified pension and profit-sharing plans by funding
them with passive income is probably the real reason for the passive in-
vestment income limitation. 55
Elimination of the passive investment income provisions would require
the amendment of certain other provisions of the Code to ensure that the
subchapter S shareholder-employees do not receive preferential treatment
over partner-employees or sole proprietors and also to prevent abuse of the
fair market distribution rule. 156 Since certain of the the pension and
profit-sharing plan requirements of the Code are less strict for subchapter
S employees than for partners or sole proprietors,15 7 abolishing the passive
investment income restriction might encourage the incorporation of indi-
vidual investment activities, followed by election of subchapter S status.
Therefore, section 1379 of the Code dealing with subchapter S qualified
pension, stock, bonus, and profit-sharing plans would have to be amended
to provide for an earned income requirement similar to that for partners
and sole proprietors, as contained in section 401(c)(2) of the Code.' 58
Furthermore, since the provisions for certain corporate statutory fringe
benefits under the Code' 59 are not available to sole proprietors or most
partners, they would have to be amended in order to avoid undue prefer-
152. Hewitt, Some Intriguing Recent Developments in Subchapter S, 44 TAXES 848, 858-
59 (1966).
153. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5096.
154. Id. at 5098.
155. See JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 21, at 11.
156. Id. at 19.
157. Under I.R.C. §§ 401(c)(3), (d)(I 1), an earned income requirement is provided in the
case of sole proprietors and partners with more than a 10% interest in order for them to avail
themselves of qualified pension and profit-sharing plans.
158. An alternative to this approach, as suggested in JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF RECOM-
MENDATIONS, supra note 21, at 20-21, would be to permit contributions to plans as long as
corporate passive investment income does not exceed the 20% termination level currently in
effect. If passive investment income exceeds 20% of gross receipts, then allowable contribu-
tions are reduced by the percentage of passive investment income. The staff recommenda-
tion permits an exception when passive investment income is less that $3,000 in the first or
second taxable year of the corporation in a manner analogous to the exemption of I.R.C.
§ 1372(e)(5)(B).
159. I.R.C. § 79 provides for the exclusion from gross income of the cost, up to the first
$50,000, of group-term life insurance purchased by employers for employees. Id. § 101(b)
provides for the exclusion from gross income of certain employee death benefits. Id. § 105
provides for the exclusion from gross income of certain amounts received by employees
under accident and health plans. Id. § 106 provides for the exclusion from employees' gross
income of employer contributions to accident and health plans. Id. § 119 provides for the
exclusion from employees' gross income of the value of meals or lodging furnished for the
employer's convenience.
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ence to subchapter S corporations, by providing that they do not apply to
shareholder-employees of subchapter S corporations. 160 Since elimination
of the passive investment income restriction would permit passive invest-
ment income assets to be distributed tax free as a return on basis with a
fair market value basis under section 301(d) of the Code, potential for
abuse would arise.' 6' Therefore, section 1375 of the Code relating to dis-
tributions of electing corporations would require amendment to provide
that a subchapter S corporation would recognize gain on nonliquidating
distributions of property unrelated to its trade or business. 162 If these
measures, and the previously discussed measures, were enacted, Congress
could repeal the somewhat meaningless, and often discriminatory and
harsh, passive investment income restriction by addressing only the real
dangers for abuse against which the restriction should protect.
V. CONCLUSION
The passive investment income restrictions on rental income have
proved to be an unwarranted discrimination against corporations owning
and leasing tenant-occupied real estate, such as commercial, office, and
apartment buildings. Despite the level of activity inherent in such busi-
nesses, the cases construing section 1372(e)(5) of the Code make it virtually
impossible for such corporations to qualify for subchapter S status. In
view of the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the cases construing the pas-
sive investment income provisions, tax planners cannot predict either the
type of activity or level of activity that would qualify as significant services
within the meaning of the regulations. In effect, owners of tenant-occupied
real estate, other than hotels, motels, and other similar examples, must
160. Alternatively, the Code could provide that the fringe benefits are unavailable to
subchapter S shareholders only when the amount of passive investment income in any taxa-
ble year would cause termination of the election under the current rules. Therefore, if pas-
sive investment income is 20% or less of gross receipts or if passive investment income for
the tax year is less than $3,000 during either the first or second year in which the corporation
commences an active trade or business, the preferential tax benefits would be available to
subchapter S shareholder-employees. See JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 21, at 21.
161. Under the general provisions of I.R.C. §§ 301, 306, actual distributions of cash or
property to subchapter S shareholders are treated as dividends to the extent of current or
accumulated earnings and profits. Under § 301, the basis of the property received and the
amount of the distribution to a noncorporate distributee are the fair market value of the
distribution. Amounts distributed in excess of current and accumulated earnings and profits
are treated first as a reduction of stock basis, a nontaxable return of capital, and then, for
amounts in excess of basis, as gain from the sale or exchange of property. Therefore, after
current and accumulated earnings and profits have been exhausted, the subchapter S share-
holder can receive tax free, except for recapture in certain cases, nonbusiness capital assets at
a stepped-up basis to the extent of his remaining stock basis. Furthermore, gain is not recog-
nized to the corporation. If the shareholder then holds his reduced basis stock until his
death, his heirs will avoid tax through the stepped-up basis rule of I.R.C. § 1014. See JOINT
COMMITTEE STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 21, at 19.
162. Recognizing that this potential for abuse also exists for § 1231 business assets, the
Joint Committee Staff Recommendations would provide for recognition of gain at the cor-
porate level on nonliquidating distributions of § 1231 property as well. JOINT COMMITTEE
STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 21, at 19.
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choose some other form of business organization in order to obtain conduit
treatment and predictability of federal tax consequences.
The only substantive reason for the passive investment income restric-
tion appears to be the prevention of abuse of certain qualified employee
benefit plans by funding them with income derived from passive invest-
ments since partner-employees or sole proprietors do not have this option.
Therefore, if subchapter S is intended to simplify election of the form of
business organization, any restrictions on qualification ought to be suffi-
ciently narrow to address only the real potential for abuse. The current
subchapter S provisions, however, entail a broad and unnecessary dragnet,
needlessly including actively derived income in several cases, yet inexpli-
cably excluding certain other forms of passive income. From their incep-
tion, the passive investment income restrictions have been overly broad in
scope. For unwary taxpayers, this arbitrary selection of proscribed income
categories has proved a quagmire that may result in the termination of
subchapter S status even though considerable business activity exists or the
amount of passive investment income is minimal. 163 Since the employee
pension and profit-sharing plan loophole can be closed, and other tax pref-
erences to subchapter S shareholder-employees prevented, the passive in-
vestment income limitation should be abolished.
163. For example, a subchapter S corporation that is beyond the first two years of its
active conduct of a trade or business, thus losing the $3,000 protective ceiling, and that is
operating at a loss, might have its election terminated by receipt of small amounts of passive
investment income when gross receipts from its active businesses are also small, because of
the gross receipts test of § 1372(e)(5).
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